



THE LIEN OF WAREHOUSEMEN AND WHARFIN-
GERS-ITS NATURE AND EXTENT.
LIENS arising out of bailments are of two kinds, the common-
law lien and the commercial lien. The former is specific only, as
in the case of common carriers and innkeepers, who are bound to
receive ind transport or entertain, for customary charges; and in
the case of artisans, who by their skill and labor impart an addi-
tional value to the thing bailed. This common-law right of specific
lien is said to rest on principles of natural equity and commercial
necessity; it prevents circuity of action and gives security and
confidence to agents. '
The commercial or general lien, the right to retain for a general
balance of account, exists in favor of factors and some others ; it
depends for its sanction upon the usages of merchants, is viewed
as an encroachment on the common law, and is said not to be
favored.
Warehousemen and wharfingers are not bound to receive the
goods of another, nor yet can they be said by their labor and skill
to impart an additional value to the thing bailed. Hence it would
seem that, under the construction given the terms labor and skill
in this connection, this class of hirers of custody derive no right of
lien from the common law.
There is a singular confusion, among our most eminent text-
writers, on the subject under consideration. Prof. Parsons, Par-
sons on Contracts, III. 268, says: "A wharfinger's lien is both
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particular and general. His rights are regarded as co-extensive
with those of the factor." Warehousemen are treated in the same
connection, and are not distinguished from wharfingers.
Judge STORY, Story on Bailments, §§ 452-3, says: "The case
of a wharfinger does not indeed seem in any respect distinguishable
from that of a warehouseman, and it has not in fact been distin-
guished from it in any solemn adjudication. * * * * * Whether
the class of persons we are considering, that is, hirers of custody,
have a lien on the thing for their hire, labor and services, is a
matter upon which the authorities do not seem agreed, or at least
do not present rules to guide us. Upon general principles it
would seem that they ought to have a specific lien on the thing,
for such hire, labor and services, like artisans. The question
whether they have a general lien for a balance of account is quite
a different question, and depends upon different principles. It
has recently been held that warehousemen have a specific lien,
although they certainly cannot be said by their care and skill to
have improved the thing bailed. The same would seem to belong
to a wharfinger."
Angell on Carriers, § 66, is to the same effect as the foregoing
extracts from Story on Bailments.
Chancellor KENT, Kent's Com., III., §§ 635-641, says: "This
-right of a particular or specific lien applies to warehousemen and
wharfingers. * * * * It was also decided by Lord KENYON, and
afterwards recognised as settled law, that a wharfinger had not
only a lien on goods deposited at his wharf, for the money due for
wharfage of those particular goods, but that he was also entitled
by the general usage of his trade to retain them for the general
balance of his account due from the owner."
In fine, while in Story on Bailments and in Angell on Carriers
the particular lien in favor of the class we are now considering is
not considered sufficiently settled, yet in Kent's Commentaries and
in Parsons on Contracts the wharfinger's right of general lien is
expressly stated, and nowhere, by any of the learned authors, is
there any allusion to a supposed distinction between warehousemen
and wbarfingers, save in Story on Bailments, and then only to be
refuted.
In the case of Rex v. Humphtrey, 1 McClel. & Y. 194, the
court, referring to the two cases in Espinasse's Reports, post,
say: "The wharfinger's lien for a general balance of account is
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equally clear and decided as in the case of a factor." "After
these cases," says GRAHAM, B., "it seems to me to be infinitely
too much to be argued in a court of law that this right of wharfin-
gers is not perfectly clear and universally admitted. * * * In my
experience I have always considered the case of a wharfinger and
of a warehouseman as standing on the same ground." But doubt
being intimated by other of the judges on the last point, the case
was reserved, and afterwards that question was held immaterial to
the same.
The first of the cases in Espinasse's Reports was Naylor v.
Aongler, 1 Esp. 109. The case was tried before Lord KENYON,
at nisi prius, in 1794. The plaintiff had purchased from one
Boyne twenty-five hogsheads of sugar, then lying in defendant's
warehouse, who was a wharfinger. Boyne was in debt to the
defendant, part of Which only was on account of the sugars; the
remainder was for the balance of a general account, for which the
defendant claimed a lien, and refused to deliver until the same was
paid. The usage was established by witness, and Lord KENYON
said, "That a lien from usage was a matter of evidence; the usage
in the present case has been proved so often, it should be consi-
dered a settled point."
Speari v. Hartley, 3 Esp. 81, was tried before Lord ELDON,
also at nisi prius. The case was identical ;with Naylor v. Afongler.
Lore ELDON said: "This point has been ruled by Lord KENYON,
and considered as a point completely at rest. I shall therefore
hold it as the settled law on the subject, that he has such a lien as
claimed in the present case."'
The American cases are few, and afford but little satisfaction.
There is probably but a single case directly upon the point. In
Scott v. Jester, 8 Eng. (13 Ark. 446), it was held that ware-
housemen had only a particular lien; the court further say:
"Warehousemen certainly have not a general lien, authorizing a
detention of goods not only for demands accruing out of the article
retained, but for a balance of accounts relating to dealings of a
like-nature." But the fact that in the decision of that cause no
reference was made to the cases in Espinasse's Reports and the
one in McClel. & Y., ante, will probably detract from its weight,
and leave its authority to depend largely upon the reasoning by
which it may be maintained.
In Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 W. & S. 466, it was held that ware-
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housemen were entitled to a specific lien; that they may deliver a
part and retain the residue, for the price chargeable on all the
goods received at the same time and under the same bailment.
Though the question was not presented by the case, the court inci-
dentally assents to the doctrine of a general lien in favor of wharf-
ingers, but adds "that no text-writer has treated of warehouse-
room as a subject of lien in any shape, and there is no evidence
of a foundation for it." The specific lien in favor of the ware-
houseman is, however, maintained in this case as a common-law
lien, not dependent on commercial usage. Said GIBsoN, 0. J., in
the case last cited: "We here see (referring to Jackson v. Cur-
mzins, 5 Mees. & Wels. 342) the expiring embers of the primitive
notion that the basis of this lien is intrinsic improvement of the
thing by mechanical means. The truth is, the modern decisions
evince a struggle of the judicial mind to escape from the narrow
confines of the earlier precedents, but without having as yet estab-
lished principles adapted to the current transactions and conve-
niences of the world."
Whether it would not have been more logical, in the first
instance, to have rested this lien on the ground assigned it by the
learned Chief Justice in the case last cited, may well admit of doubt.
And whether commercial convenience would not have been better
subserved by giving a general lien in favor of wharfingers and
warehousemen only for the balance due them on account of wharf-
age or warehouse charges, instead of extending the lien to all
balances whatsoever, it is now too late to inquire.
The wharfinger's lien is now firmly fixed, both in this country
and in England; it is fixed upon the basis of a commercial usage
that has become law, and it unquestionably extends to all balance
of account whatsoever that may be due by the owner.
It would indeed tend to inextricable confusion to allow the
wharfinger's lien as commercial, and deriving its sanction from
usage only, and at the same time to maintain that of the ware-
houseman as a common-law right.
In respect to this right of lien, there can be no possible distinc-
tion in reason between the wharfinger and the warehouseman, nor
is there any to be found in authority. While it is true that in the
first of the cases in Espinasse's Reports, "defendant was a wharf-
inger having the goods stored in his warehouse," and in the other
is also spoken of as a wharfinger, yet it is apparent from the text
of the cases that no such distinction was deemed to exist.
